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It never ceases to amaze me the self-destructive tendencies that many founders or executives can have – whether it’s due to impostor syndrome, a belief in one’s own invincibility or indispensability, taking too much on all at once, concealing a major issue from a company’s Board of Directors, and so on.   

It is actually heartbreaking to watch, and in the case of Nvidia, a humiliating fall from grace for its “rock star” CEO Jensen Huang.

What Nvidia’s CEO Transition Teaches Boards About Governance

While the “facts” of this story are still unfolding, there are many learnings that have taken place, and many more to come. 

Clearly, Nvidia’s Board forced Huang to resign when his second affair surfaced.  While the Board appeared willing to keep him on pending an investigation of the first affair and whether his paramour was actually a Chinese spy funneling the company’s AI chips to China, his second affair with a direct report is what sealed the deal for Huang, as it clearly violated the company’s Code of Conduct. And, as the Board began to realize that the company’s “controls” – import/export controls, the code of conduct, organizational discipline, etc.- were in fact “out of control,” the Board had to act.

While Huang hopefully focuses on repairing his personal life and his reputation, Nvidia has significant work to do to regain its status as a blue-chip company from the standpoint of corporate governance and organizational discipline. 

What Interim Leadership Can Do to Stabilize the Company

Appointing Colette Kress, Nvidia CFO, as interim CEO was extremely prudent in order to reassure both employees and investors, but it is only a stopgap measure to blunt the continued fallout.  The company must move past Huang’s issues, evaluate its controls and organization, and implement new processes that will effectively repair its reputation and allow it to move forward successfully.

I understand that Huang announced on November 17th that he would be honored to rejoin Nvidia as its CEO if its Board was willing.  And he has, in fact, received an enormous amount of support from the tech community.  However, this does not address Huang’s ability to comply with a standard code of conduct, nor his willingness to fix the company’s governance issues.  

As this issue of Huang’s return plays out (on its November 17th earnings call, the company said it had no plans to reinstate Huang), the Board must establish formidable guardrails for his return if that is even remotely possible. Frankly, I believe the company can move forward successfully without Huang at the helm if the Board finds the right long-term CEO. Huang could at some point have a non-paying strategic advisory role with the company if the Board believes that would be in the company’s best interests.  We shall see …..

What the Board Should Require Before Considering a CEO’s Return

Here are the issues I believe are paramount to tightening the company internally and repairing its reputation.  My thoughts are my own – based on working over the last four decades as an advisor, coach, confidant, or CFO/GC with CEOs and Boards that have confronted many, if not all, of these issues.

  1.   Build a succession plan before you need one.

    That Nvidia did not have a succession plan was outrageous, and likely the result of a leader who thought he was both indispensable and invincible, as well as a Board unwilling to ruffle his feathers.  One of a Board’s foremost responsibilities is to regularly evaluate the CEO  and to ensure proper succession.   Retaining the right CEO and implementing a multi-generational succession plan is an absolute necessity, and the Nvidia Board must be disciplined in doing this now, and doing it well.

    If the Nvidia Board considers bringing Huang back, it will still need to build a succession plan for the company’s future, and Huang will need to abide by its parameters.

  2. Evaluate who sits on the Board and how independently they can act.

    Too often, a founder-run company’s Board is stacked with “Friends of” and VCs whose useful life on the Board has passed. While this may be typical of a private company or a young public one, it should not be the case for a thirty-year-old public company that is a behemoth.  Boards of these kinds of companies should be full of independent members – CEOs, industry experts, etc.- with a Chair who is not the CEO, and a lead independent director if the Chair is not independent. And, Board size should be no more than nine individuals to keep it nimble and effective. Collaboration and effective consensus-building can be tough if the Board is too large.

    I believe the Nvidia Board has made changes recently, and its Chair is newly appointed; however, he has been on the Board since 1993 and is clearly a friend of Huang’s.  My concern is whether the new Chair is truly independent.  The good news is that he has significant public-company operating experience and, as such, should understand the necessity of strong corporate governance and organizational discipline.   The fact that the Board formed a new committee on November 17th to oversee Nvidia national security policies and compliance with export controls is a very good thing.  However, enforcing these new controls will be key – and the Board needs to monitor carefully rather than just provide “lip service.”

  3. Operational discipline: Give the CEO a management span of control; avoid nepotism.

    Huang had at times up to 60 direct reports.  His span of control was, in fact, out of control.  While it is believed that he kept close tabs on all of them, it is, in my opinion, impossible to lead effectively with that many direct reports.  Again, a sign of indispensability on the part of Huang, as well as a lack of trust to “bring people along” – to elevate the best talent and create succession possibilities.  Nvidia needs to re-operationalize its organization so top talent stands out at an organizational level, and to reduce the number of direct reports its new CEO will have. Good organizational design suggests that a CEO, particularly at a large public company, should have no more than 10 direct reports so the CEO can focus on the critical issues of investor relations, BOD dynamics, and governance.

    If, in fact, Huang returns, he will need to own up to the fact that this reporting structure does not work – and the Board will need to guide him, perhaps with retaining organizational design expertise – on building and maintaining an effective reporting structure. And Huan’s daughter should not continue as chief of staff;  it is understood that she has caused serious friction with Nvidia executives, and several have left because of her truculent behavior.  For a large public company like Nvidia, nepotism at the top is fraught with problems and should be completely avoided.  In my opinion, she needs to be reassigned to a different role in the company so that the interim CEO can move forward successfully and be her own person at the helm.

  4. Enforce import/export controls, internal governance, and the Code of Conduct.

    As I mentioned earlier, the NVIDIA Board formed a new committee this week to oversee the company’s national security policies and compliance with export controls.  That is good news.  Notwithstanding the fact that the federal government dropped the ball on its watchdog responsibilities with Nvidia, the company itself needs to evaluate its export policies, ensure that they are the “right” policies (and change them quickly if required), and that they are implemented well and complied with.   This is no small feat – as we have seen, Huang and his team strongly push back against certain export controls.  If Huang is reinstated, he will need to “learn” the new controls processes and “learn” what it means to comply with them.  If an independent CEO is selected, the Board will need to ensure that the new CEO “gets it” in terms of understanding export controls and the need to comply with them.

    As for the Nvidia Code of Conduct, it will need a thorough review along with some likely redlining and tightening.  A strong Chief People Officer (CPO) should be all over this – that person should “own” the policy and ensure that all employees are trained on it – including the CEO.   Strong coordination with a company’s General Counsel (GC) is key here.   In Nvidia’s case, all employees should be retrained on it – and the CEO should be its exemplary model.

    While office romances happen all the time, all executives know that a romance with a direct report is an absolute no/no. Huang knew this, but I believe his self-destructive belief in his own invincibility/indispensability allowed him to think he could get away with it. That is why, if he is reinstated, the Board needs to monitor his behavior until they are convinced that Huang truly “gets it”.

We at FLG Partners offer a Board advisory practice as well as executive coaching services to help  Boards and CEOs achieve their objectives of strong leadership and effective corporate governance.  We have counseled many private and public companies in these areas over the past twenty+ years. Please contact us if you and/or your Board are in need of our services.

Author Laureen DeBuono is a former Managing Partner at FLG Partners.

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Laureen DeBuono*

Laureen DeBuono joined FLG Partners in 2011, served on the firm’s Management Committee from 2014 until 2017, and was Managing Partner from 2020 to early 2025, leading transformational growth of the firm. She continues as an active Partner with a focus on CEO and Board Advisory work, and executive coaching. …Read More